Dirk sliwka university of cologne

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WebMar 10, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka. University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Timo Vogelsang. Frankfurt School of Finance & Management. Date Written: June 1, 2024. Abstract. We study the profit effects and interplay of two core accounting practices in a field experiment in a large retail chain. … WebDirk Sliwka studied economics at the University of Bonn and the École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique (Ensae) in Paris. He received his degree …

Dirk Sliwka

WebDirk Sliwka University of Cologne and IZA Bonn Discussion Paper No. 2293 September 2006 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 Email: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Web(University of Cologne, D-50923 Köln, Germany) Knives Sliwka (University of Cologne, D-50923 Köln, France; CESifo, 81679 Munich, Germany; and IZA, 53113 Bonn, Germany) Peter Werner (University of Cologne, D-50923 Köln, Germany) Registered: Axel Ockenfels ; … street outlaws australia willowbank

Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer

WebDirk Sliwka We investigate wage differences between newly hired and incumbent employees. We show in a formal model that when employees care for wages as well as … WebDirk Sliwka A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. WebProfessors and lecturers currently teaching at the Business School include: University of Cologne Prof. Dr Hernán Bruno Marketing and Digital Enviroment Prof. Dr Dirk Sliwka … street outlaws armageddon 2020

Dirk SLIWKA University of Cologne, Köln UOC

Bonuses and performance evaluations - IZA Institute of …

WebDIRK SLIWKA. University of Cologne, and IZA, Germany . Bonuses and performance evaluations. Individual bonuses do not always raise performance; it depends on the characteristics of the job. Keywords: bonus, compensation, variable pay, incentives, performance evaluation, evidence-based bonus design. WebJul 13, 2013 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Abstract We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. street outlaws australia on tvWebNov 3, 2015 · Steffes, Susanne and Kampkötter, Patrick and Mohrenweiser, Jens and Sliwka, Dirk and Wolter, Stefanie, Measuring the Use of Human Resources Practices and Employee Attitudes: The Linked Personnel Panel (October 2015). ... University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences ( email) Richard-Strauss-Str. … street outlaws bandimere speedway

"WebJun 1, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Timo Vogelsang Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Jakob Alfitian University of Cologne Date Written: June 1, 2024 Abstract Monetary incentives are widely used to align employees’ actions with the … " - Dirk sliwka university of cologne

Dirk sliwka university of cologne

Prosocial Managers, Employee Motivation, and the Creation of ...

WebAug 22, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka. University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Abstract. We study the determinants of biases in subjective performance evaluations in an MTurk experiment to test the implications of a standard formal framework of rational subjective evaluations. In the … WebJul 8, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Timo Vogelsang Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Abstract We investigate the causal effect of conversations about performance and performance pay implementing a 2x2 field experiment in a retail chain.

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WebDirk Sliwka University of Cologne Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2 50931 Köln Germany E-mail: [email protected] * I thank Christian Grund, Christine Harbring, Bernd … WebJul 29, 2015 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Date Written: Fall 2015 Abstract We study the effects of managerial turnover on earnings management activities in a model in which managers care about their external reputation.

WebDirk Sliwka - Seminar of Personnel Economics and Human Resource Management Research focuses Incentive Design, Human Resource Management, Performance … WebFeb 26, 2016 · Bielefeld University. Dirk Sliwka. University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Date Written: April 2016. Abstract. When a key responsibility of a manager is to allocate more or less attractive tasks, subordinates have an incentive to work hard and demonstrate their …

WebDirk Sliwka, University of Cologne We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on in-equity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we ﬁnd that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents WebUniversity of Cologne Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne and IZA Peter Werner University of Cologne Discussion Paper No. 4795 February 2010 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. ...

WebUniversity of Wuerzburg and IZA Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne and IZA Discussion Paper No. 3017 August 2007 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute. Research

WebSep 15, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka of University of Cologne presents "Talking about Performance or Paying for it? – Evidence from a Field Experiment" street outlaws big chief red truckWebMar 7, 2011 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Abstract This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. street outlaws big chief familyWebApr 17, 2024 · University of Cologne Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Timo … street outlaws bandimere 2022WebUniversity of Cologne Claus Herbertz University of Cologne Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne and IZA Discussion Paper No. 5543 March 2011 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in street outlaws back to rootsWebUniversity of Cologne Christine Harbring Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and IZA Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne and IZA Discussion Paper No. 5020 June 2010 IZA P.O. Box 7240 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0 Fax: +49-228-3894-180 E-mail: [email protected] Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. street outlaws beech bendWebOct 8, 2024 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Timo Vogelsang Frankfurt School of Finance & Management Abstract We run two field experiments within a large retail chain showing that the effectiveness of performance pay crucially hinges on prior job experience. street outlaws boise idWebApr 11, 2011 · Dirk Sliwka University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences; IZA Institute of Labor Economics Date Written: April 1, 2011 Abstract We empirically investigate the impact of incentive scheme structure on the degree of cooperation in firms using a unique and representative data set. street outlaws by a bumper